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Surrogacy is increasingly becoming more accepted in the state as an alternative method of 
beginning families. However, the practice is not protected by legislation. There has been tabled 
a Bill, the Reproductive Health Care Bill, that has made some provision for this practice. It too 
however, has not made provision for the specific issue that is the legal parentage of a child born 
via surrogacy. Judicial decisions on the matter have been inconsistent due to the lack of a 
relevant and specific piece of legislation. This study sought to investigate the cogency of the 
right to surrogacy, that is, examine whether such a right exists and consequently determine, on 
that basis, which party should be represented as the legal parent of the child. 
The study was conducted through a literature review of material on the right to surrogacy and 
the legal parentage of the resulting child. It established that the right to surrogacy that can only 
be defended as a contractual right, and not a reproductive right. This conclusion was arrived at 
after an examination of the reproductive right to surrogacy found that such a right would not 
be enforceable. The contractual right to surrogacy however, that finds its basis in the doctrine 
of freedom of contract, can be defended because of the underlying element of intention. This 
paper argues that the intention to parent should be the primary consideration in determining 
parenthood; and neither genetics nor gestation should play a primary role. 
Through comparative case studies of different jurisdictions, the study finally recommends that 
a system that confers parenthood, at the first instance, on the commissioning parents, is the 
most suitable for a jurisdiction that seeks to avoid legal battles. This should be effected through 
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Definition of Terms 
Commissioning Parents: A person (s) who enters a surrogate motherhood agreement 
with a surrogate mother. 
[Children’s Act. No 38 of 2005; South Africa] 
They are also referred to as intending parents. 
Gestational Surrogacy: The process by which a woman attempts to carry and give 
birth to a child created through in-vitro fertilization using the 
gamete or gametes of at least one of the intended parents and 
to which the gestational surrogate has made no genetic 
contribution 
[Reproductive Health Care Bill, 2014; Kenya] 
Surrogacy Agreement:  An agreement between a surrogate mother and an intending 
parent, in which it is agreed that the surrogate mother will 
be artificially fertilized for the purpose of bearing a child for 
the commissioning parents. 
[Children’s Act No 38 of 2005; South Africa] 
Surrogacy Arrangement: The process running from when the surrogate mother is 
artificially fertilized for the purpose of bearing a child for 
the commissioning parents, until the child is born. 
Surrogate Mother: An adult woman who enters into a surrogate motherhood 
agreement with the commissioning parent (s) 
[Children’s Act No 38 of 2005; South Africa] 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
Becoming a parent is an important part of a person’s life. Unfortunately, some couples are 
unable to have children of their own. Fortunately for them, all over the world, surrogacy has 
emerged as an alternative way of starting families. A surrogacy agreement is one made between 
a surrogate mother and the commissioning parent or parents, clarifying that the surrogate 
mother will bear a child for the commissioning parent/s and surrender the child to them when 
the child is born.1 It is possible to have either one, or both parents contribute to the genetic 
makeup of the child.2 The appeal of this method of conception is that there is an opportunity 
for genetic connection between a parent and the offspring, unlike adoption.3  
There are two types of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy. Traditional 
surrogacy involves a couple contracting with a surrogate mother to have the intentional father's 
sperm artificially inseminated into the surrogate.4 The second type of surrogacy, gestational 
surrogacy, can take place in several ways: 
‘The intentional mother can use her own egg and the intentional father will use his 
own sperm, and the embryo, will be fertilized outside of the womb, and will then be 
transplanted into the uterus of the surrogate mother. In this case, the surrogate is not 
genetically related to the child and will be used when the intentional mother is 
physically unable to carry the child on her own. Other options include using the 
intentional father's sperm and the egg of an anonymous donor or using both sperm 
and egg donors to create the embryo that will be implanted in the surrogate.’5 
Until 2014, the Kenyan law had not contemplated the regulation of such a method of parenting. 
This changed when the Reproductive Health Care Bill that attempted to address this gap in the 
                                                 
1 Stoll J, ‘Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood: Swedish Law in a Comparative Context’, Uppsala 
University, 2013, 24. 
2 Epstein R.A, ‘Surrogacy: The case for Full Contractual Enforcement’, 81 (8) Virginia Law Review, 1995, 2305-
2341, 2307. 
3 Epstein R.A, ‘Surrogacy: The case for Full Contractual Enforcement’, 2307. 
4 Garrity A, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great Britain: A Proposed Model 
Statute for Louisiana’, 60 (3) Louisiana Law Review, 2000, 809-832, 809: ‘A traditional surrogacy arrangement 
occurs through artificial insemination. Through the advances of modem technology, it is not necessary for the 
surrogate mother to have intercourse with the intentional father. The surrogate mother will be artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of the intentional father’. 
5 Garrity A, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great Britain: A Proposed Model 
Statute for Louisiana’, 809-810. 
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law was tabled before the Senate for debate. It provides for the right to gestational surrogacy, 
which it defines as the process by which a woman attempts to carry and give birth to a child 
created through in-vitro fertilization using the gamete or gametes of at least one of the 
commissioning parents and to which the gestational surrogate has made no genetic 
contribution.6  
The Bill was strongly supported when it was introduced in the Senate; it passed both its first 
and second readings,7 and at present, has been passed with amendments.  The amended Bill 
was read a First Time in the National Assembly on the first day of December and committed 
to the Departmental Committee on Health for consideration.8 
The Bill has clearly outlined the requirements for valid contractual agreements as regards 
surrogacy.9 The Bill provides guidelines for the qualification of the surrogate mother, the 
commissioning parents and the process itself.  However, as this would be the only statute 
regulating this practice, it is important that it addresses all the issues.  As it stands, the Bill has 
no express provisions on who the parent of the child shall be, yet this is an essential part of 
these agreements.  In the case of J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others,10 
the Children’s Court, where the matter had been first raised, directed that the commissioning 
parents should be registered as the legal parents of the children. The High Court agreed with 
this ruling and stated that the child is entitled to the identity of his or her genetic parent,11 and 
in principle, the registration of the commissioning parents, as opposed to the surrogate mother 
as a parent, must be permitted. It also held that while registration of the birth mother as the 
children’s mother on the notification of birth was within the law, it is admitted that Kenya does 
not have a law that governs surrogacy and related issues and it was thus open for the hospital 
to record the commissioning parents in the notification. 
                                                 
6 Clause 2, 7, The Reproductive Health Care Bill (2014). 
7 The 11th Parliament, The Senate, Bills Tracker as at 12.02.2016  
http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/house-business/bills-tracker on March 8 2016: At its second reading, the 
Bill was unanimously supported by 25 votes to nil. 
8 The 11th Parliament, the National Assembly, Official Report, Thursday 1st December 2016 
http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/house-business/hansard accessed on 12-Dec-2016. 
9 Clause 6-15, The Reproductive Health Care Bill (2014). 
10 [2014] eKLR. 
11 In this case, the genetic parents were the commissioning parents. 
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Due to the lack of a law, there has been no consensus in the treatment of the issue of legal 
parentage.  In A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others, the contributors of the gametes 
were put in a position where they had to apply to adopt their child.12  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The Constitution outlines the right to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes 
the right to health care services, including reproductive health care. There is however, no law 
governing surrogacy in the country, an integral part of reproductive health care,13 save for a 
parliamentary Bill. The Bill, albeit a step in the right direction, has left out the important legal 
issue that is the legal parentage of the child born via surrogacy. This law falls short of offering 
a sensible means of achieving the key objective of the protection of the needs of children and 
other vulnerable parties involved in the surrogacy arrangement.14 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
The Constitution assures the enjoyment of the right to reproductive health care.15 The practice 
of surrogacy is an integral part of reproductive health care,16 and unfortunately, has no law 
governing it in Kenya. It is a novel practice in Kenya and a number of cases have been 
presented to the courts, in an attempt to enforce the rights claimed. This issues discussed in the 
cases indicate that there is a craving for certainty on the matter of who the baby’s legal parents 
are. 
Despite there being no provision on who the legal parents of the child are, the underlying issue 
is whether there is a right to surrogacy, beyond the fact that the Reproductive Health Care Bill 
has proposed it. Upon determination of this question, and the question of what form such a 
right shall take, if it is indeed a right, the direction that the law should take on the legal 
parentage of the child, shall not be difficult to infer.  
                                                 
12 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others [2015] eKLR. Despite the willingness of the hospital to register 
the birth certificates in the names of the commissioning parents, according to the law, the contributors of the 
gametes were in a position where they had to apply to adopt their child. The reason given for this was that the 
surrogate mother is the mother of the children until such a time as the necessary legal processes are undertaken or 
until a Court has issued requisite orders in that regard. 
13 Twine F.W, Outsourcing the Womb: Race, Class and Gestational Surrogacy in a Global Market, 2ed, 
Routledge, New York, 2015, 81. 
14 Horsey K & Sheldon S, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, 20 Medical Law 
Review (2012), 67-89, 70. 
15 Article 43, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
16 Twine F.W, Outsourcing the Womb: Race, Class and Gestational Surrogacy in a Global Market, 81. 
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A regime of law that can comprehensively govern this new reproductive technology is needed, 
so that people do not fight or kill each other when the biological mother claims that because 
she bore the child in her womb for nine months, that child is hers, yet she was a surrogate 
mother.17 
As was said by Lord Mance; 
‘The law should be certain, so that it can be easily enforced and so that people can 
know where they stand. We expect that of Parliament when it frames statute law, and 
of judges when they expound the common law. We expect it in our relations with 
authority, and in our relations with each other.’18 
1.4 General Objectives 
This research shall analyse the relationship between the right to surrogacy and the effect of 
such a right, or lack thereof, on the legal parentage of the resulting child. 
1.5 Specific Objectives 
This research aims: 
i. To analyse the right to surrogacy; 
ii. To analyse the status of parenthood and its representation in law; and 
iii. To make recommendations on the legal practice of surrogacy in Kenya. 
1.6 Research Questions 
The following questions shall be the subject of this research: 
i. Does there exist a right to surrogacy? 
ii. What form does such a right take? 
iii. Who should the legal parents of a child born via surrogacy in Kenya be? 
1.7 Literature Review 
It is important to understand, before analysing who the legal mother of the child is, the right to 
surrogacy itself. Is there a right to surrogacy? Christine Straehle in her article ‘Is There a Right 
                                                 
17 Parliament of Kenya, The Senate, The Hansard, Thursday, 18th June, 2015, 45. 
18 Lord Mance, ‘Should the law be certain? The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St 
Mary The Virgin, Oxford’ 11th October 2011, 1. 
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to Surrogacy?’19 argues that the right to surrogacy indeed exists but can only be defended as a 
contractual right, not as a procreative right.20 She states that she has accepted that surrogacy is 
a greatly beneficial practice to persons that are unable to have their own biological children; 
but opines that it cannot be protected as a procreative right because it is not possible to enforce 
against other right-holders, and against the state.21  
The question of whether there is a right to surrogacy would need to take into account the various 
issues that affect not only the commissioning mother, but also the surrogate mother and the 
baby itself. In Martha A. Field’s book, a number of arguments have been posited.22 It has been 
said to be exploitative of women;23 a baby-selling venture;24 a nail in the foot that is the 
conventional family;25 and harmful to the children born via it.26 On the other side of the 
argument is the position that it may be discriminatory to limit having children to only those 
who can have them naturally27 and that there is no real and discernible evil present.28  
Having shed some light on the right to surrogacy, the issue of the legal parentage of the child 
born via surrogacy is important and has been discussed by a number of authors. Kirsty Horsey 
and Sally Sheldon in their article ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating 
Surrogacy’29 state that the common law position that the birth mother would be the legal mother 
is one that makes no exception for cases of full surrogacy, where the egg used to conceive the 
pregnancy was not her own.30 
It also notes that regardless of who the legal parent of the child on birth is, this is a status that 
can be extinguished by the granting of a Parental Order, which can transfer parenthood to the 
commissioning parents in certain specified circumstances.31 Yet, there are a range of practical 
problems with the process of applying for a Parental Order, which have been justly 
                                                 
19 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’ Journal of Applied Philosophy (2015), 1-14. 
20 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 2. 
21 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 2. 
22 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, Harvard University Press, 
England, 1990. 
23 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 25. 
24 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 17-19. 
25 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 33. 
26 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 54. 
27 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 47.  
28 Field M.A, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues - Expanded Edition, 58. 
29 Horsey K & Sheldon S, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, 20 Medical Law 
Review 2012, 67-89. 
30 Horsey K & Sheldon S, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, 81. 
31 Horsey K & Sheldon S, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, 81. 
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characterised as ‘overly restrictive’, ‘burdensome and complex’.32 For instance, the application 
must be made in a Family Proceedings court, with the Guardian ad litem charged with checking 
the existence of a genetic link with one of the commissioning parents, confirming that no 
payment (beyond reasonable expenses) has been made and with ensuring that the child’s 
welfare is respected.33 
Jane Stoll in her thesis ‘Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood: Swedish Law in a 
Comparative Context’,34 notes the importance of regulation that clarifies parenthood in 
surrogacy arrangements. She stated that a jurisdiction can substantially minimise the risk of 
disputes over the right to parenthood following surrogacy arrangements by establishing 
regulation clarifying parenthood in such situations.35 Regulation that clarifies the respective 
legal parental statuses of the parties following surrogacy arrangements and provides a 
mechanism for the transfer of parental rights and obligations from the surrogate to the 
commissioning parent (s), would guarantee a greater degree of certainty.36  
Carla Spivack in her article ‘Surrogate Motherhood in the United States’37 discusses the four 
theories that American courts use in establishing parenthood in surrogacy agreements.  The 
first theory is parenthood by intent which states that ‘when gestation and genetic ties do not 
coincide in one woman, the natural mother is she who intended to bring about the birth of a 
child that she intended to raise as her own’.38 In applying the next theory, which is parenthood 
by contract, the courts uphold surrogacy agreements on the contract principles, that is, he who 
the contract states is the parent, stands as the parent.39 Parenthood by genes states that the 
persons with a genetic tie to the child stand as the child’s parents.40 The final theory is 
parenthood by gestation. The courts refuse to grant a commissioning mother parental rights 
over the objection of the gestational mother; his approach employs the ancient common law 
                                                 
32 Jackson E, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001, 273-
275. 
33 Horsey K & Sheldon S, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, 82. 
34 Stoll J, ‘Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood: Swedish Law in a Comparative Context’, Uppsala 
University, 2013. 
35 Stoll J, ‘Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood: Swedish Law in a Comparative Context’, 83. 
36 Stoll J, ‘Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood: Swedish Law in a Comparative Context’, 83. 
37 Spivack C, ‘The Law of Surrogate Motherhood In The United States’, 97-116, 58 The American Journal Of 
Comparative Law (2010). 
38 Spivack C, ‘The Law of Surrogate Motherhood In The United States’, 103. 
39 Spivack C, ‘The Law of Surrogate Motherhood In The United States’, 105. 
40 Spivack C, ‘The Law of Surrogate Motherhood In The United States’, 105. 
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presumption that the woman who gives birth is the mother, and also recognizes the bond 
established during the nine months of pregnancy.41  
Kirsty Horsey in her article ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy 
Arrangements’,42 argues that intention to parent should operate as the pre-birth determinant in 
‘awarding’ parental status when a child is born.43 Intention here encompasses the motivation 
to have a child, initiation and involvement in the procreative process and a commitment to 
nurture and care.44 
Adoption may be a simpler, more appropriate parenting option. However, while this may 
satisfy the mothering role of a woman, it does not quench her desire to beget and bear; that is, 
to bring forth a life into the world.45 As Plato, stated, ‘there is a sense in which nature has not 
only somehow endowed the human race with a degree of immortality, but also implanted in us 
all a longing to achieve it…One expression of that longing is…the wish not to lie nameless in 
the grave. Mankind is immortal because it always leaves later generations behind to preserve 
its unity and identity for all time: it gets its share of immortality by means of procreation.’46   
1.8 Theoretical Framework 
This research is based on the philosophy of human rights. Human rights protect human dignity 
and integrity, and are most significant for those who are disadvantaged or vulnerable.47  
There are two approaches to the matter of the philosophy of human rights: foundationalism and 
functionalism. Foundationalism grounds the nature of human rights in a pre-political 
substratum of moral thought to which positive legal-political institutions ought to conform.48 
This theory assumes that human rights are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply 
in virtue of their humanity.49 Functionalism on the other hand, posits that it belongs to the 
                                                 
41 Spivack C, ‘The Law of Surrogate Motherhood In The United States’, 106. 
42 Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ 22 (4), Child and 
Family Law Quarterly, 2010, 449-474. 
43 Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’, 455. 
44 Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’, 455. 
45 Chadwick, F. R, ‘Having Children: Introduction’ in R.F Chadwick (ed) Ethics, Reproduction and Genetics 
Control, London Croom Helm, 1987, 3-43. 
46 Chadwick, F. R, ‘Having Children: Introduction’ in R.F Chadwick (ed) Ethics, Reproduction and Genetics 
Control, London Croom Helm, 1987, 3-43. 
47 Freeman M.D.A, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2014, 1287. 
48 Sangiuliano A.R, ‘Towards a Natural Law Foundationalist Theory of Universal Human Rights’, Osgoode Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 111, 2015, 1- http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/111 on 12 
December 2016. 
49 Tasioulas J, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’, 65, Current Legal Problems, 2012, 1-30, 18. 
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essence of human rights that they play a certain political role or combination of such roles, for 
instance, operating as benchmarks for the legitimacy of states or triggers for intervention 
against states that violate them.50 
This theory shall assist the research by shedding light on the question of whether the right to 
surrogacy is at all a human right, in order to aid the discussion of rightful legal parentage of a 
surrogate child.51 
This research is also based on the doctrine of freedom of contract. The branch of this doctrine 
that shall be relied on is that which states that contractual freedom only allows for the 
conclusion of fair contracts.52 This is important to note because previously, there was an 
unwillingness to interfere with the contracts entered into,53 resulting in the exploitation of the 
weaker parties.54 
1.9 Hypothesis 
This paper proceeds on the presumption that the legal framework proposed to govern the 
practice of surrogacy, a novel practice in Kenya, is not sufficient in that it has not stated 
expressly in the proposed Bill, the legal parentage of the child. 
1.10 Assumptions 
This research proceeds on the assumption that the information found in books and articles is 
up to date, especially as the area of research is relatively novel. 
1.11 Research Methodology 
The method to be used to gather information for this paper shall be through the use of 
qualitative data. 
                                                 
50 Tasioulas J, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’, 1. 
51 The Constitution of Kenya (2010) states that every person has the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, which includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care. The Reproductive 
Health Care Bill has been proposed in pursuance of this article of the Constitution, as an Act of Parliament to 
provide for the recognition of reproductive rights. 
52 Rödl F, ‘Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory)’, 76 Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 2013, 57-70, 62. 
53 Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson [1875], Court of Appeal of England and Wales. 
54 Gilmore G, The Death of Contract, Ohio State University Press, Ohio, 1974, 104. 
9 
 
This study shall make use of qualitative data. It shall use a library-based research as the main 
method of data collection. Secondary data such as books and articles on the topic shall be read 
widely.  
This research shall also consider case studies and comparative analyses of countries that have 
legislated the law on surrogacy. This is important for the research in that, as a relatively new 
area of law for Kenya, it is possible, but not assured, that this will point the country in the right 
direction. 
1.12 Limitations 
The following may limit the study: 
i. Novelty: this is a largely unexplored legal field in Kenya and there is little material that 
has been written on it locally.  
ii. Bias: this is an inclination of temperament or outlook; especially a personal and 
sometimes unreasoned judgment.55  There is the possibility that, being human, there 
would be an inclination towards focusing only on the research that supports my 
hypothesis. I have attempted to limit this to the absolute minimum by structuring my 
research questions to accommodate whatever outcome the research provides. 
1.13 Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter One: This is the introduction and background to the research problem. 
Chapter Two: The theoretical framework. 
Chapter Three: This chapter shall carry out an analysis of the right to surrogacy, and what 
form that right should take. It shall then discuss the legal parentage of the child and the 
determinants of such a status in this unique arrangement. 
Chapter Four: This chapter shall conduct a comparative case study on the laws governing the 
legal parentage of children born via surrogacy in the United Kingdom and in South Africa. 
This shall shed light on what may be included in our law in order to make it more 
comprehensive.  
                                                 
55 Merriam Webster Dictionary: Definition of ‘bias’. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bias on February 17 2016.  
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Chapter Five:  This chapter shall discuss with finality, the findings from the study, the 
conclusion and make recommendations for the filling of this gap in the law.   
11 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
The Kenyan Constitution provides for the right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
which includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care.56 The 
UDHR, as well as the ICESCR also legislate this right. Is it cogent to infer the existence of a 
right to surrogacy from the right to health? Does there exist such a right as this? Can there exist 
such a right as this?  
This chapter discusses the philosophy of human rights, which is the theoretical framework of 
this paper. It introduces human rights and gives a working definition, and then proceeds to 
discuss the two major theories underpinning the philosophy of human rights. 
2.2 The Philosophy of Human Rights 
The philosophy of human rights investigates the nature of a human right, or what kind of object 
a human right is within our broader system of normative thinking.57 This analysis is important 
for the simple reason that the moral merits and philosophical foundations of all areas of law 
are worth examining.58 A supposed right does not automatically become a genuine demand of 
human rights morality merely by being set down in an official instrument.59 
2.2.1. What is a Human Right? 
According to James Nickel, human rights are: 
‘Basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have simply 
because they are people. They attach to particular individuals who can invoke them; 
they are of high priority and compliance with them is mandatory rather than 
discretionary. They are considered universal in the sense that all people have and 
should enjoy them, and independent in that they exist and are available as standards 
of justification and criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by 
the legal system or officials of a country’.60 
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Human rights engage a wide variety of disciplines: a moral dimension as they represent urgent 
moral concerns that states must never ignore; a political dimension as they set standards of 
basic political legitimacy; a legal dimension as they are posited and enshrined in national 
constitutions and international treaties; and a social dimension, as they are asserted for the 
purposes of resisting oppression and exploitation.61 Ideally, these dimensions interact with one 
another to culminate in a cogent and comprehensive bill of rights. 
Each and every individual human being is an ultimate focus of moral concern; there are moral 
duties that are directly ‘owed to’ these individual human beings; that because they are human 
beings equipped with the capacity to realize certain values in their lives, they each possess 
certain rights, independently of whether or not they are actually enforced or even recognized 
socially.62 
James Nickel, writing on the nature of human rights states that various elements come into play 
in their definition: a right holder, an object, a duty holder and the normative content.63 The right 
holder is the party who has the right.   
The right has an object, that is, what the right is a right to.64  This creates a focus and a direct 
link from the right to the object. There is also for every right a duty-holder, the party directed 
to do something about making available to the right holder the object of the right.       
Finally, there is for every right, the normative content of the right.65 This specifies the 
normative position of the addressees and right holder in relation to the object.  It may involve 
the affirmation or denial of duties, and the ability or disability to alter the rights or legal status 
of others.  James Nickel at this point, using two rights, attempts to illustrate that rights may 
vary in their content: the right not to be tortured and the right to marry.66  At the core of the 
right not to be tortured is the claim each person has not to be tortured and the duty each person 
has not to torture others. This is a right that cannot be waived or alienated. Now consider the 
right to marry.  At its core is neither a claim each person has to be married nor a duty each 
person has to marry others.  Rather, at its core is a liberty or privilege to seek the consent of 
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others to enter into marriage and thereby to alter the legal status of oneself and another.67  That 
is, there is the idea that no person is under a duty not to seek the consent of others to enter into 
marriage and that every person has the power to marry.68 
Human rights can be assessed according to what interests they aim to protect and what claims 
they may entitle its holders to make.69 On the one hand, some rights give rise to positive claims 
against others, and often the state, to help realize the right in question; on the other hand, some 
rights simply entitle their holder to negative claims against others, which is to say that the 
rights-holder has the right to non-interference in the exercise of the right.70  
2.2.2. The Two Theories 
There are two main contemporary theories of this philosophy; foundationalism and 
fundamentalism. The former dictates that human rights have importantly distinctive normative 
grounds as compared with other moral norms while the latter states that the essence of human 
rights is in playing a certain political role or combination of such roles.71 
a. Functionalism 
According to functionalism, whose initial advocate was John Rawls,72 even if all human rights 
are ultimately a sub-set of the general class of natural rights, they possess certain distinctive 
functions and it is this practical significance that defines their nature as human rights.73 
On this view, the nature of a human right is grounded in its functional role in regulating the 
conduct of political institutions within the legal-political practice of universal human rights.74  
Human rights have a defining normative function: they impose duties that are ‘owed to’ all 
people simply by virtue of their humanity. Over and above this defining function, they perform 
other functions, including political functions. For instance, human rights are relevant to 
assessing the status and performance of governments.75 
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This theory does not hold water however, because it is not written into the concept of a human 
right that they perform these other functions: 
‘One can adequately grasp what a human right is without reference to any political 
role, just as one can understand what a nuclear weapon is without reference to its 
political uses. Whether and to what extent a particular human right should play any 
such political role is a matter for substantive argument; it is not something constitutive 
of its nature as a human right.’76 
b. Foundationalism 
As stated earlier, this theory holds that human rights have importantly distinctive normative 
grounds as compared with other moral norms.77 Its main tenet is that human rights are moral 
rights possessed by all human beings simply by virtue of their humanity.78 However, there are 
two tents in the camp that is foundationalism: status-based foundationalism and interest-based 
foundationalism.  
Status-based foundationalism claims that the primary grounding of human rights cannot be in 
human interests because there is a discrepancy between the logic obeyed by the two different 
camps.79 They argue instead, that the foundation of human rights must be in the ‘status’ of their 
holders as inviolable members of the moral community.80 This is a worthy position but one that 
is not without its challenges. 
One of its challenges is that it seems to have understood the interest-based view as advocating 
for utilitarianism or consequentialism and thus, does not give any room for interests in the 
justification of human rights.81 Utilitarianism would argue that it is reason enough to kill one 
innocent person in order to prevent three other innocent persons being killed by someone else. 
However, this is exactly what the logic of rights forbids: trade-offs in the recognition of a 
human right to life.82  
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Interest-based foundationalism does not identify human rights with the actual interests that 
underlie them, as this would mean that whatever stands in the way of the interest would be 
considered a violation of the right.83 On the contrary, the content of the duties generated by the 
interest is considered. Moreover, these are the interests of individual people, who by virtue of 
their characteristic human capacities, equally enjoy a certain moral status,84 and one 
implication of that status referred to as ‘human dignity’, is that their interests cannot be traded-
off against each other in the way mandated by a simple aggregative utilitarianism. Interest-
based foundationalism is therefore the union of human interests and moral status; the status of 
individuals is to be honoured primarily by respecting, protecting and advancing their 
interests.85 
Interest-based foundationalism holds that considerations of the human good are at the root of 
human rights.86 However, this hypothesis does not hold for all rights; in fact, it only applies to 
a small sub-set of human rights, for instance, basic needs or our interest in freedom. The leading 
formulation of this position is by James Griffin. Freedom, according to him, comprises two 
values: autonomy, the capacity to choose a conception of the good life from a range of 
worthwhile options and liberty, the capacity to pursue one’s choices without interference from 
others.87 Our capacity to choose and pursue a good life, he says, is the relevant dimension along 
which humanity is set apart from non-human animals, thus rendering freedom the only interest 
capable of grounding human rights.88 
Until this point, it would seem that freedom-based foundationalism would function as the best 
basis for human rights. However, John Tasioulas introduces a version of interest-based 
foundationalism that includes a plurality of human interests. He defends this by holding that 
the existence of human rights is underscored by a plurality of universal human interests and 
this fact does not compromise the nature of human rights in any way.89 He introduces the idea 
of a threshold at which interests generate human rights that he notes should be satisfied.90 
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It requires that in the case of each individual, the underlying individualistic considerations of 
moral status and universal interests suffice to generate duties with the same content, resulting 
in a situation where human rights are not distinguished by the values underlying them, but by 
their nature as universal moral rights .91 
There are two stages in the application of this threshold.92 The internal stage investigates only 
those considerations of status and interests, of the putative right-holders that are supposed to 
ground the existence of the right. It is thus asked whether, in the case of all human beings, a 
duty with the proposed content is cogent enough to serve the underlying values.93 The external 
stage considers the implications of affirming the right for other values and other persons, 
especially would-be duty-bearers.  
To illustrate this analysis, he uses the example of romantic love. Acknowledging that love is 
one of the most life-enhancing aspects of the human experience, he asks; 
‘Does it automatically follows that anyone is under a positive duty to love anyone 
else? Is there in this sense a right to be loved romantically? Such a right seems to 
be precluded at this first stage: the very nature of romantic love is at odds with the 
existence of a positive duty to love others. Even supposing that the duty to love 
another romantically is not inherently self-defeating, it would fail at the second 
stage.  It may reasonably be concluded that no such duty actually exists, because 
the burden it imposes on potential duty-bearers in terms of autonomy, spontaneity, 
and the strains of psychological self-policing is excessive.’94 
This example touches directly on the situation presented by the practice of surrogacy. It cannot 
cogently be concluded that any one woman has the right to the services of another woman as a 
surrogate mother because the burden it imposes in terms of autonomy, spontaneity, and the 
strains of psychological self-policing is excessive 
Noting the above, it is also prudent to note that, for any given right, its effective realization will 
depend more on a more precise specification of the content of its associated duties and their 
bearers, than pure moral reasoning itself will yield.95 However, moral reasoning has a place in 
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the sphere of human rights; the convention and law must operate within the parameters 
identified by that reasoning.96 
Thus, the best philosophy of human rights is that which grounds human rights in a plurality of 
human interests, as the human rights are not distinguished by the values underlying them, but 
by their nature as universal moral rights, possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of 
their humanity.97 
2.3 The Doctrine of Freedom of Contract 
Most people never consider the importance of the right to contract, which is essentially the 
ability to gain and dispose of possessions and services, alter legal relationships, and act with 
some guaranty as to future obligations and rights.98 It is not until one is faced with the prospect 
of not having that right that its value becomes more readily apparent.99 
Classical contract theory emerged in the late nineteenth century,100 and the classic statement of 
freedom of contract is found in Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson:101 
‘It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say 
that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one 
thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts when freely and voluntarily entered into shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to 
consider - that you are not to lightly interfere with this freedom of contract.’102 
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Classical contract theory's emphasis on unrestricted freedom of contract had its roots in 
nineteenth century political philosophy, which declared ‘the end of man is freedom’.103 
However, this principle did not appreciate the harsh realities of the market at the time: equal 
parties did not exist and strong parties were able to impose unfair and oppressive bargains upon 
those who were weak and vulnerable.104 
Florian notes of the liberal method: 
‘The traditional liberal approach combined individual autonomy and corrective justice 
as the two general principles of contract law. Although it is accepted as indispensable 
for some features of contract law, the liberal approach, with its two principles, is 
considered too narrow to cover all relevant parts of contract law. It is also criticized 
as too narrow from a normative point of view, as it is interested only in the formal 
freedom of property owners and contractors, not in the substantive freedom of human 
beings, which depends in large part on notions of distributive justice in judicial 
holdings.’105 
As a criticism to the classical contract theory, the social approach emerged: from its 
perspective, the traditional liberal approach had proved incapable of coping conceptually with 
the developments emerging, that is, that in in order to prevent a stronger party from exploiting 
a weaker party, there was an ever-growing body of contract rules that placed limits on the 
freedom of contracting.106  
Some scholars claimed that freedom of contract could only survive in an economy where trust 
and good will existed between parties who did business.107 Comprehensive reforms in the law 
were necessary, they insisted, to channel the exercise of liberty toward cooperation and 
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decency, and, thus, to preserve the bargain contract as the vehicle to facilitate the most efficient 
distribution of resources in the economy.108 
Joseph Chamberlain in 1885 also criticised the faith that had been placed in freedom of contract 
for the best part of the nineteenth century: 
‘The great problem of our civilisation is still unresolved. We have to account for and 
to grapple with the mass of misery and destitution in our midst, co-existent as it is 
with the evidence of abundant wealth and teeming prosperity. It is a problem which 
some men would set aside by reference to the eternal laws of supply and demand, to 
the necessity of freedom of contract, and to the sanctity of every private right of 
property. But gentlemen, these phrases are the convenient cant of selfish wealth.’109 
This attitude continued into the twentieth century: in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd,110 Lord Denning compared the freedom of contract to oppression of 
the weak: 
‘...faced with this abuse of power, by the strong against the weak, by the use of the 
small print of the conditions, the judges did what they could to put a curb upon it. 
They still had before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract’. They still knelt down and 
worshipped it, but they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used it to 
stab the idol in the back. This weapon was called ‘the true construction of the 
contract’. They used it with great skill and ingenuity. They used it so as to depart from 
the natural meaning of the words of the exemption clause and to put upon them a 
strained and unnatural construction.’111 
Contract law rules can only be understood as emanating from a concurring influence of both 
approaches.112 This is what is referred to as the mixed approach. The goal of this approach, and 
all others, is to reconcile the idea of contractual freedom and contractual justice in a way that, 
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on the one hand, represents a coherent understanding of the basic structure of contract law and, 
on the other hand, illuminates contract law in its modern version.113 
There are three conceptual ways to reconcile contractual freedom and justice that Florian Rodl 
outlines in his article:114 
i. The first option can be called the procedural understanding of contractual freedom. 
According to this understanding, the concept of fairness can only apply to the procedure 
of contracting. The fair procedure is then represented as contractual freedom, that is, 
the freedom to choose the terms of a contract.  Whatever the outcome of a fair procedure 
of contract formation, this theory does not judge the contract upon the substantive 
fairness of its terms. Contractual freedom in this case includes not only the 
voluntariness of each party’s consent, but also, arguably, equal bargaining power.115 
ii. The second option might be called the instrumental understanding of contractual 
freedom. According to this view, contractual freedom has a direct impact on the 
resulting fairness of a contract. Also in this version, contractual freedom includes the 
idea of equal bargaining power. In contrast to the procedural understanding, it is not 
denied that the substance of a contract can be judged with regard to its fairness. 
However, if the favourable procedural conditions, that is, contractual freedom including 
equal bargaining power, are met, the law refrains from correcting the substantive 
unfairness of a contract.116 
iii. The alternative to both of these options is that by its nature, contractual freedom only 
allows for the conclusion of fair contracts. There is no tension between the two concepts 
of contractual freedom and contractual justice because contractual freedom can only be 
exercised in voluntary agreements with fair terms.117  
The freedom to contract argued for is the basic right of an individual to enter into agreements 
that gain or dispose of possessions, services or otherwise alter legal relationships.118 Contract 
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law involves a balancing of conflicting social values and the third alternative seems to be have 




CHAPTER THREE: WHO SHOULD THE BABY’S LEGAL PARENTS BE? 
3.1 Introduction 
The right to surrogacy is one that has been supported by many as an emerging method of 
reproduction. However, it has also faced strong opposition. It has been defended as a negative 
reproductive right in that, one that should be free from interference by the state.  
This chapter posits, based on the arguments of legal scholars, that this right, if defended as a 
reproductive or procreative right, would not meet the threshold of a right. However, it would 
qualify as a contractual right, based on the principle of freedom of contract, but one that would 
still remain subject to some regulation by the state. 
3.2 The Right to Surrogacy 
Rights can be assessed according to what interests they aim to protect, and what claims they 
may entitle its holders to make.119 These claims may be divided into those that give rise to 
positive claims, often against the state and those that give rise to negative claims, that is, the 
right-holder can claim the right of non-interference when exercising his right.120 When 
assessing the claims a right may generate, it must be asked what is necessary for the realization 
and protection of the interest at stake.121 
A right to surrogacy may be understood as aiming to protect two different interests, and 
generating two different sets of claims: the right to assisted procreation and contractual rights. 
3.2.1. As a right to Assisted Procreation 
The interest protected by this, is the right to have biological children.122 It has been argued by 
some that this right is highly valued because the ability to have children and parent them 
provides individuals with uniquely valuable opportunities to realize themselves and their 
deeply held goals in life.123 If this argument is accepted, that is, the protection of the interest of 
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individuals to have children and create a family, then we may accept that those who don’t have 
this ability need to have access to a right to surrogacy in order to realize this interest.124 
What claim would the protection of such an interest give rise to?125 There are a number of 
reasonable claims that can be made against the state in pursuance of such an interest, for 
instance In-Vitro Fertilization treatment.126 It can in fact be said that the state has a 
responsibility to help those of its members who cannot realize this basic interest without 
help.127 The basis for this is the state’s underlining responsibility to enable individuals to lead 
autonomous lives centred and organised on defensible self-chosen goals and projects.128 In this 
view, to procreate is a project individuals have and cherish, and societies that value the 
individual projects of their citizens should help realize them 129 It logically follows then that by 
entering into a surrogacy agreement, commissioning parents are simply exercising their 
procreative right to become parents.130  It has been accepted thus far that there is a right to 
procreate and that surrogacy can help realize this right. With this in mind, the next issue is 
whether a right to procreate outside our own body can exist.131 
The kind of society in which the right to procreation is recognized, is one that, as has been 
mentioned, is wedded to ideas of individual autonomy for all of its members.132 In such a 
society, individuals have to consent to their employment and the goal of protecting the 
individual interests of some would not be traded for the interests of others.133 What this means 
for surrogacy is that couples may have an interest in procreation, but lack a surrogate, thus 
rendering the right to surrogacy meaningless.134 It has been asked whether it is intelligible to 
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claim a right to something that is impossible.135 A right to surrogacy as a right to assisted 
procreation would be adjudged unintelligible to the extent that it is not possible to promise the 
effective protection of the interest at stake, where the protection requires the collaboration of a 
third party who in this case, is the surrogate mother. It is not certified that sufficient numbers 
of women would sign up to be surrogates, and more importantly, because there cannot be 
coercive legislation over the disposal of persons’ individual bodies, a state’s jurisdiction cannot 
extend thus.136  
Predicated on the foregoing, a right to surrogacy can’t be plausibly understood as a claim right 
against the state.137 
3.2.2. As a Contractual Right 
Conceiving of surrogacy as a contractual right protects a different set of interests than the ones 
discussed above: the interests of the contractual parties involved to enter a contract freely.138 
Grounding the regulation of surrogacy agreements in contract, relying on the principles of 
autonomous bargaining, freedom of contract and the built-in ability of contract law to police 
unconscionable bargains, would offer protection to all parties.139 The nature of the contract has 
been defended, not as a sale contract, but as a contract for the provision of services.140 Both 
parties enter the contract on the assumption that the prospective surrogate agrees to engage in 
reproductive labour on behalf of the commissioning parents.141 She gives her time, energy and 
bodily resources to enable the commissioning couple to have a child.142  
The freedom of contract is an important interest to be protected. However, the scope of the 
right to freedom of contract cannot be assessed independently of the interests such a right aims 
to protect, and without assessing the relationship between the interest at stake and the need for 
protection through freedom of contract.143 This is to say that a contract for the murder of a 
person, or the restriction of trade shall not be protected.144 At the basis of a surrogacy 
                                                 
135 Warnock, M, Making Babies: Is There a Right to Have Children?, Oxford University Press, 2002, 14. 
136 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 6. 
137 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 6. 
138 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 6. 
139 Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ 464. 
140 Mengual A and Wolfe N, Surrogacy, World Youth Alliance, White Paper, November 2015, 4. 
141 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 6. 
142 Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’, 470. 
143 Straehle C, ‘Is There a Right to Surrogacy?’, 7. 
144 Epstein R. A, ‘Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement’, 2316. 
25 
 
agreement, lies the agreement to bear a child for the commissioning parent(s) and an 
undertaking to hand over such a child to them with the intention that the child concerned 
becomes their legitimate child.145 However, do any negative externalities from surrogacy 
contracts reach that level, or even come close to it?146 Freedom of contract would be considered 
a liberty right most clearly when, without such freedom, the interest it aims to protect can’t be 
realized. It can be said that without freedom to enter into surrogacy contracts, some couples 
won’t be able to realise their interests in biological children.147 
The effect of contracts is twofold: on the parties as between themselves and on third persons. 
This has, and continues to influence the stand on matters of surrogacy.  
Where both parties have engaged voluntarily in a transaction, there is the prospect of mutual 
gain,148 which is not present when invalidating conditions such as force, duress, fraud or 
misrepresentation are present.149 The commissioning couple have an intimate interest in the 
condition and conduct of the surrogate mother,150 who wants suitable parents for the child she 
will give birth to and is empathetic for the plight of the infertile couple.151 There has been an 
assumption that surrogates are vulnerable, easily exploited and somehow deserve special 
protection.152 Contrarily, there has been evidence that far from being vulnerable, surrogates 
feel empowered by their ability to exercise control over their bodies in this way and the altruism 
that underpins surrogacy agreements.153 
One of the validating elements of contracts is consideration: simply, each party must give 
something in return for what is gained from the other party.154 In the context of unpaid 
surrogacy, as is the focus here, there can be sufficient consideration for the contract to be 
binding.155 The father’s promises, or detriment, or even reliance on the commitment given to 
hand over the child, could also constitute consideration even if the surrogate mother received 
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nothing of value.156 In addition to this, women found to be performing as surrogates for their 
own satisfaction and not for valuable reward, have received consideration as the court defines 
it.157 
Possible limits are often justified by the kind of harms that such contracts can provoke, for 
instance; the vulnerability that such an arrangement invokes, on the surrogate mother’s end, 
due to the long-standing practice of gender inequality and the conditions imposed by the 
contract that may be undesirable to her.158 There is also taken the position that the surrogate 
mother’s sense of self is harmed.159 This would void the position of the right to surrogacy as a 
contractual right because entering a contract as being based on autonomous decision making 
cannot be defended if the decision will undermine a personal sense of self, thus making any 
further autonomous decision impossible.160 Unlike what has been said, in fact, it may be argued 
that quite to the contrary, surrogate work provides women with more possibilities to develop 
an extended sense of self and a basis of self-respect, and for two reasons: such work allows 
them to realize some of their own goals, and surely it gives them satisfaction to be able to help 
an otherwise childless couple to realize an important goal.161 
Only a concern for the wellbeing of the future child should justify restrictions to surrogacy 
contracts.162 Moreover, these restrictions should not be tied to the fact that children are born 
via surrogacy; instead, they are justified by a concern about who should be a parent.163  
Thus introduces the discussion on persons who are not parties to voluntary transactions but 
may necessarily be hurt by them, begging the question whether such transactions should be 
invalidated because they produce adverse effects on third parties.164 The third party discussed 
herein is the resulting child.165 An in-depth discussion of this matter by Richard Epstein 
indicates that the most correct position to take is that the resulting child is unlikely to be 
affected adversely. Surrogate arrangements are usually a last resort for desperate couples who 
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have tried to conceive without success.166 The risk that the children would be unloved is not 
nil, but there is no reason to conclude that it is any higher than that of children conceived 
naturally.167 The mere existence of a child confers rights against its natural parents; the legal 
obligations to the child survive the surrogacy contract and offer protection that is every bit as 
solid, and probably less needed, than similar rights against natural parents.168  
Having noted the foregoing, this argument will now focus on intention to be legally bound by 
a surrogacy agreement, as the basis for determination of legal parentage of the resulting 
child.169 
3.3 The Legal Parentage of the Resulting Child 
Kirsty Horsey’s paper, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy 
Arrangements’, argues that those who intended to be the parents of the child should be legally 
recognized as the parents of the child from birth.170 This argument only applies to the specific 
case of surrogacy, leaving the parentage of children conceived by natural means, as is.171  
At present, Kenya has no law regulating the practice of surrogacy and the resulting dilemma 
on who the legal parents of the resulting child should be. In the case of J L N & 2 others v 
Director of Children Services & 4 others,172 the Children’s Court, where the matter had been 
first raised, directed that the commissioning parents be registered as the parents of the children. 
The High Court agreed with this ruling and stated that the child is entitled to the identity of his 
or her genetic parent and in principle, the registration of the genetic parents, as opposed to the 
surrogate mother as a parent, must be permitted. It also held that while registration of the birth 
mother as the children’s mother on the notification of birth was within the law, Kenya does not 
have a law that governs surrogacy and related issues and it was also open for the hospital to 
record the genetic parents in the notification. In an opposing decision in A.M.N & 2 others v 
Attorney General & 5 others,173 despite the willingness of the hospital to register the birth 
certificates in the names of the commissioning parents, according to the law, the contributors 
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of the gametes were in a position where they had to apply to adopt their child. The reason given 
for this was that the surrogate mother is the mother of the children until such a time as the 
necessary legal processes are undertaken or until a Court has issued requisite orders in that 
regard. The latter case based its decision largely on the United Kingdom’s legislative structure 
as Kenya has no law on the matter. 
This inconsistency caused by a lack of legislation is a problem because, it serves as an absolute 
barrier to the automatic legal recognition of the commissioning parent or parents, as the case 
may be, despite the fact that they intend to raise the child. This is done without a discussion on 
whether this prevention is either necessary or desirable, or in the best interests of any 
prospective child, a principle that should underpin all clinical assisted reproduction practices.174  
There is no contention that surrogacy is not natural conception. All the same, it finds its basis 
herein and is designed to replicate it, at least to an extent. The notably missing legislation on 
parenthood in surrogacy arrangements is really a reflection of traditional assumptions about 
parenthood.175 Traditionally, intention to parent, genetics and gestation in the child bearing 
process have always intersected, while in surrogacy arrangements, each of these functions may 
be found in a different party.176 The former is considered normal,177 while the belief 
surrounding the practice of surrogacy is that it is ‘reproductive prostitution’.178 
A number of reasons have been posited in support of the position stated in the law; that the 
birth mother is the legal mother of the child.179 The first argument is that bonding occurs 
between the gestational mother and the child.180 There is both scientific and anecdotal evidence 
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to support the bonding hypothesis, but there is also evidence to the contrary.181 Additionally, 
this argument prioritizes the mother while doing nothing for the father.182 
It has also been stated that it is generally better for a child to stay with its gestational mother.183  
This is loosely based on a best interests’ argument.184 In the United States, for instance, there 
is a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to remain with or be placed with its 
natural parents.185 At the same time, it is not in the best interests of the child to have any or all 
of its potential parents locked in dispute over parenthood.186 Moreover, it is not always the case 
that the child’s natural parents are its best option as this ascribes prima facie parenthood to a 
couple that never intended to keep the child and may not promote the child’s welfare.187 
Finally, it is argued that the gestational mother contributes the most to the creation of the 
child.188 While it is true that the gestational mother contributes an endocrine cascade that 
determines how the child will grow, when its cells will divide and differentiate in the womb, 
and how the child will appear and function for the rest of its life,189 the commissioning parents 
invest, both emotionally and financially, more than any other party.190  
The arguments defending the gestational mother would not be the best fit for situations such as 
the ones contemplated by this paper; an appropriate stand would be one that predicates the 
determination of parenthood on the intention to parent.  
In many cases, the genetic parents are also the commissioning parents, but this is not always 
the case.191 Sometimes, only one parent has a genetic link to the child and it would be 
undesirable to distinguish between parents in this way by dictating that parenthood is based on 
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genetics.192 It is noted that the importance of genetic ties cannot be understated, as this is the 
basis of parenthood when children are conceived by normal means.193  
‘Genetic parents share a unique biological relationship with the child…an important 
aspect of parenthood is the experience of creating another in one’s own likeness and 
part of what makes parenthood meaningful is the parent’s ability to see the child grow 
and develop and see oneself in the process of this growth. Infertility is thus painful 
and creates a desire that may impel one to use surrogacy. The genetic presumption 
may not be damaging when applied to those who can conceive naturally…but for 
those who cannot have a genetically related child, it offers no solution to an unfulfilled 
desire to become parents.’194 
All the same, genetic ties are as socially influenced as anything else, and unnecessarily 
prioritizing such a requirement when there are more suitable alternatives would only serve an 
artificial function.195 In addition to this, it has been argued,196 that the claim of genetics as a 
binding factor is based in property theories.197 This however, fails from the outset. The major 
premise of this argument is that persons possess property rights in the products, processes and 
organs of their bodies and in any commodities developed from these sources.198 The minor 
premise provides that a child is a product of one’s genetic issue. The logical conclusions is thus 
that the genetic donor should have property rights or quasi-property rights in the child. There 
is however, a problem with this argument: 
‘One may possess property rights in their genetic issue but they most certainly do not 
possess property rights in the results of their genetic contributions; children are not 
property that can be owned. Thus, while one may have something approximating 
property rights in his or her gametes, their status with regard to an embryo is less 
certain. But certainly, upon birth, the property metaphor is no longer apposite. It is 
surely, not fitting. The production of gametes does not establish the according of 
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parental rights. For the genetic donor to argue that he or she has a claim to parent the 
child, it must be by virtue of some other form of contribution to the procreational 
arrangement.’199 
The sale of children is prohibited by international conventions.200 Children, like all human 
persons, are deserving and possessive of human dignity that is inherent in all. 
The missing link in the previously mentioned methods of parenting is filled in by intention 
based parenthood. Intention here encompasses the motivation to have a child, initiation and 
involvement in the procreative process and a commitment to nurture and care.201 Kirsty Horsey 
raises four specific arguments,202 originally raised by Hill, for the recognition of intention-
based parenthood in surrogacy arrangements whose underlying message is that: 
‘The use of reproductive technology is an unambiguous indicator of intent. Users of 
such technology intend to produce a child and intend to accept the responsibility of 
caring for it. Use of the surrogate method, manifesting procreative intent, should 
invoke the legal presumption that the child belongs to the intenders.’203 
The first argument is the prima facie importance of the commissioning parents in the 
procreative relationship.204 Without their initiative, the conception and birth of the child could 
not have happened.205 The conception is commissioned by them.206 The second argument picks 
up from the first: the commissioning parents commissioned the conception of the child and 
intend to be ones actively involved in its care (emphasis own).207 This implies that parenthood 
actually involves more than the genetic and gestational elements.208 
Thirdly, leaving room for the transfer of parenthood permits the surrogate to go back on her 
word, when, by contracting with the commissioning parents, her stated intention was always 
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to relinquish the child.209 Intention is an important contractual element that creates binding 
contracts.210 The surrogate mother should not be allowed any room to change her mind. The 
following has been said about honoring the parties’ intentions: 
‘Legal rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should 
recognize the importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions 
and decisions into the future. Where such intentions are deliberate, explicit and 
bargained for, where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations…they should 
be honored.’211 
The final reasons are pragmatic.212 There is need for certainty and uniformity: commissioning 
parents should know from the outset that they will be presumed legal parents and are 
responsible for the child’s well-being. This would mean that determination of parenthood in 
surrogacy arrangements need not be settled by court order. It should be determined from the 
onset, by law. Eventually, due to the certainty attached to the process, only those most 
committed to surrogacy would consider being surrogate mothers.213 
Surrogates are not passive; they deliberately choose to act as surrogates, especially in countries, 
such as ours, where commercial surrogacy is an impossibility and it is done with altruistic 
motives.214 As a matter of fact, should she so choose, the burden should lie with her, to show 
that the legal parenthood should be altered and awarded to her; otherwise she should he held 
to the agreement.215 
Naturally, this line of argument begs the question of what happens to children who are born to 
families where intentions have changed.216 In such a case, where for instance, the child is born 
disabled and is rejected on that basis,217 the certainty argument would continue to work. The 
commissioning parents would be held to their agreement, on the basis of their intention.218 The 
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law currently gives room for such an occurrence and places the responsibility of the child on 
the surrogate mother, when the child was one that she never intended to have.219 
3.4 Conclusion 
The distinction between legal parents is important as legal parents will remain parents for 
life.220 Families change as society continues to transform, evidently; and in recognition of this, 
the method of determining legal parenthood must also be reformulated.221 Other elements than 
intention may be valued, but they are surely unnecessary as it is rather clear that neither the 
genetic, sexual or gestational elements are necessary for successful parenting.222 The 
recognition of intention more precisely reflects the expected outcome for all the partied 
concerned:223 the commissioning parents intend to be parents and the surrogate mother intends 
to have a child for others.224 Quite important to note is that the surrogacy contract is not the 
sale of a child.225 
The recognition of intention based parenthood would mean that the determination of 
parenthood in surrogacy arrangements is no longer subject to court orders,226 simplifying the 
process of acquiring parenthood and avoiding the plethora of problems outlined herein. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 
SURROGACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction 
The practice of surrogacy was first legislated in the United Kingdom in the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act of 1985. Not long thereafter, the HFEA 1990 was enacted, and it provided 
a more comprehensive legal framework while also serving to amend the first Act. In 2008, 
HFEA was also amended. 
The laws of the United Kingdom merely serve as guidelines for the Kenyan courts based on 
the relationship the two countries have as commonwealth states.227 Their laws are not 
enforceable in Kenyan courts.228 This is not entirely adverse as the laws of the two countries 
because our legal systems only agree until a certain point where there are points of contention, 
for instance, the legality of same-sex couples’ registration as the parents of the child. 
Much closer to the Kenyan legal system and one from which Kenyan laws have heavily 
borrowed before, is the South African legal system, including the Constitution and the 
Children’s Act of 2005.229 The Children’s Act of 2005 expressly provides for the practice of 
surrogacy, and accompanying issues such as who the legal parents of the child are. Research 
also indicates that is also the only African country that has comprehensively legislated the law 
of surrogacy. 
The two jurisdictions chosen for this comparative study have been identified for the different 
things they bring to the table. The choices have also been limited to these two, as they illustrate, 
most closely, the model that is considered most appropriate for Kenya. The first choice, the 
United Kingdom, is illustrative of a model that includes transfer of parenthood, since the child’s 
parents are, at first, the surrogate parents. The second choice, South Africa, uses a different 
model, where the child is recognized, from birth, as being the commissioning parents’ child.  
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4.2 Regulatory Framework on Surrogacy in the United Kingdom 
4.2.1. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act (as amended in 2008) 
This Act is relevant for its definition of a surrogate mother as a woman who carries a child in 
pursuance of an arrangement made before she began to carry the child, and made with a view 
to any child carried in pursuance of it being handed over to, and the parental rights being 
exercised (so far as practicable) by, another person or other persons.230 
4.2.2. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
One of the reasons for which this Act was enacted was to make provision about the persons 
who in certain circumstances are to be treated in law as the parents of a child.231 This is an 
important inclusion in the law of assisted reproduction as such a lacuna creates uncertainty, 
resulting in an inconsistent interpretation of the law. 
a. Meaning of Mother 
The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo 
or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child.232 
b. Meaning of Father 
If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or of the sperm and eggs or of her artificial 
insemination, the surrogate mother was a party to a marriage, and the creation of the embryo 
carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of her spouse, her spouse is to be treated 
as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the placing in her of the 
embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination, as the case may be.233 
If the surrogate mother is not married, but: 
(a) the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in her, or she was artificially 
inseminated, in the course of treatment services provided in the United Kingdom by a 
person licensed to do so; 
(b) at the time when the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in the surrogate mother, 
or at the time of artificial insemination, the agreed fatherhood conditions were satisfied 
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in relation to a man, in relation to treatment provided to the surrogate mother under the 
licence; 
(c) the man remained alive at that time; and 
(d) the creation of the embryo carried by the surrogate mother’s sperm was not brought 
about with the man’s sperm; 
the man is to be treated as the father of the child.234 
The agreed fatherhood conditions are as follows:235  
a) The man has consented to being treated as the father of any child resulting from 
treatment provided to the surrogate mother; 
b) The surrogate mother has given her consent to the treatment of the man as such; 
c) Neither the man nor the surrogate mother has at any time withdrawn their consent to 
the treatment of the man as the father of the child; 
d) The surrogate mother has not given her consent to the treatment of another man as the 
father of the resulting child; and 
e) The man and the surrogate mother are not within prohibited degrees of relationship in 
relation to each other.   
Where a person is to be treated as the father of the child by any of the means mentioned above, 
no other person is to be treated as the father of the child.236 
Provision is also made for persons who are not to be treated as the father of the child:237 where 
a man consensually serves the purpose of a sperm donor, he is not to be treated as the father of 
the child.in addition to this, where the sperm of a man, or an embryo the creation of which was 
brought about with his sperm, was used after his death, he is not to be treated as the father of 
the child, unless he consented to such use before his death. This applies whether the surrogate 
mother was in the United Kingdom or elsewhere at the time of the placing in her of the embryo 
or of the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination.238 
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c. How is parenthood transferred? 
In the United Kingdom, parenthood in cases of assisted reproduction is transferred by way of 
parental orders.239 This is provided for in Section 54 of the HFEA. 
Two people, referred to as ‘the applicants’ may apply to the court for an order providing for a 
child to be treated in law as the child of the applicants if:240 
(a) the child has been carried by a woman who is not one of the applicants, as a result of 
the placing in her of an embryo or sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination; 
(b) the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the creation of the 
embryo, and 
(c) the conditions hereunder are fulfilled. 
Both of the applicants must have attained the age of 18.241 The applicants must be either 
married; in a civil partnership; or two persons who are living as partners in an enduring family 
relationship and are not within prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each other.242 
They must apply for the order within 6 months of the day on which the child is born.243 At the 
time of making the application, the child must be living with the applicants and either or both 
of the applicants must be domiciled in the United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the 
Isle of Man.244 
The court must be satisfied that both the woman who carried the child, and any other person 
who is a parent of the child but is not one of the applicants, including any man who is the father 
by the means mentioned above, have freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, 
agreed unconditionally to the making of the order.245 This however, does not require the 
agreement of a person who cannot be found or is incapable of giving agreement; and the 
agreement of the woman who carried the child is ineffective if given by her less than six weeks 
after the child’s birth.246 
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The court must also be satisfied that no money or other benefit, other than for expenses 
reasonably incurred, has been given or received by either of the applicants for or in 
consideration of the making of the order; for any agreement to the making of the order; for the 
handing over of the child to the applicants, or for the making of arrangements with a view to 
the making of the order, unless authorised by the court.247 
4.3 Regulatory Framework on Surrogacy in South Africa 
4.3.1. The Children’s Act, 38 of 2005 
This Act defines a surrogate mother as an adult woman who enters into a surrogate motherhood 
agreement with the commissioning parent.248 A surrogate motherhood agreement is an 
agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent in which it is agreed that 
the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a child for the 
commissioning parent and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such a child 
to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, with the 
intention that the child concerned becomes the legitimate child of the commissioning parent.249 
a. The Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 
A surrogate motherhood agreement is only considered as valid if the conception of the child 
contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both 
commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid 
reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the commissioning 
parent is a single person, the gamete of that person.250 The commissioning parent or parents 
must be unable to give birth to a child and such condition should be permanent and 
irreversible.251 
A surrogate motherhood agreement is also rendered invalid unless the following conditions are 
met:252 
(a) the agreement is in writing and is signed by all the parties thereto; 
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(b) the agreement is entered into in the Republic; 
(c) at least one of the commissioning parents, or where the commissioning parent is a single 
person, that person, is at the time of entering into the agreement domiciled in the 
Republic; 
(d) the surrogate mother and her husband or partner, if any, are at the time of entering into 
the agreement domiciled in the Republic although the court may dispose of this 
requirement;253 and 
(e) the agreement is confirmed by the High Court within whose area of jurisdiction the 
commissioning parent or parents are domiciled or habitually resident.  
Any surrogate motherhood agreement that does not comply with the provisions of the Act, is 
invalid.254 
b. Termination of the Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 
The surrogate motherhood agreement may not be terminated after the artificial fertilisation of 
the surrogate mother has taken place.255 That is to say that once the agreement is confirmed, a 
surrogate mother who is not genetically related to the resultant child cannot terminate the 
agreement and refuse to hand over the child.256  
c. The Legal Parentage of the Child 
Any child born of a surrogate mother in accordance with the surrogate motherhood agreement 
is for all purposes the child of the commissioning parent or parents, from the moment of the 
birth of the child concerned.257 The surrogate mother is obliged to hand the child over to the 
commissioning parent or parents as soon as is reasonably possible after the birth.258 The 
surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives have no rights of parenthood or care of 
the child,259 and the surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives have no right of 
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contact with the child unless provided for in the agreement between the parties.260 The child 
will have no claim for maintenance or of succession against the surrogate mother, her husband 
or partner or any of their relatives.261 
Any child born as a result of any action taken in execution of an invalid surrogate motherhood 
arrangement is for all purposes deemed to be the child of the woman that gave birth to that 
child.262 
4.3.2. General Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health 
The preamble of this document recognizes women’s rights to bodily integrity and notes that 
this must be taken into account when facilitating women in making their own choices. The 
concept of reproductive health offers a comprehensive and integrated approach to health needs 
related to reproduction: it puts women at the centre of the process, and recognizes respects and 
responds to the needs of women. It also notes that women have a unique vulnerability because 
of their reproductive function and role.263 
The definition of reproductive health adopted at the conference reads as follows: 
‘Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease and infirmity, in all matters relating to the 
reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore 
implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have 
the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how to do so. 
Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to 
have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning 
of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which 
are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health care service that 
will enable women top go safely through pregnancy and childbirth’.264  
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This would serve to provide women with the best chance of having a healthy infant.265 
In the section discussing surrogacy, the document notes that special attention has to be made 
to the ethical principle of protection of the surrogate mother who can be exploited because of 
her socioeconomic status.266 The autonomy of the surrogate mother should also be respected 
and the surrogate arrangement should not be commercialized.267 
4.4 Conclusion  
The two states studied, United Kingdom and South Africa, have different stands on the legal 
parentage of the resulting child. The United Kingdom’s practice dictates that the surrogate 
mother is the legal mother of the resulting child and her spouse or another man who so agrees 
is the legal father. However this state of parenthood is easily transferrable by way of a parental 
order. South Africa on the other hand, indicates that the resultant child is considered for all 
intent and purposes as the child of the commissioning parents.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to conclude the research undertaken. It shall outline the findings, 
recommendations and conclusions of the study. The main aim of the study was to analyse the 
relationship between the right to surrogacy and the legal parentage of the resulting child. 
5.2 Findings 
5.2.1 The Reproductive Health Care Bill 
The study found that there is no Act governing the practice on surrogacy which is an integral 
part of reproductive health care.268 As the right to reproductive health care is one that is 
provided for in the Constitution,269 it is imperative that it is protected by law. There has been 
proposed a Bill and it is acknowledged that this is necessary progress.270 However, this Bill has 
not sufficiently addressed the issues that present in the unique situations that are surrogacy 
arrangements. Specifically targeted by this study is the fact that it has made no mention of the 
legal parentage of the resulting child.   
This has resulted in an inconsistency in the judgments issued by the judiciary, with one court 
declaring the genetic mother the legal mother, and another declaring the surrogate mother the 
legal mother. This creates uncertainty, for the various parties involved in the surrogacy 
agreement and plagues the beginning of the child’s life with tiresome litigation that can be 
avoided by legislation that would function as a yardstick for such decisions. 
5.2.2 The Right to Surrogacy 
Human rights can be assessed according to what interests they aim to protect and what claims 
they may entitle its holders to make.271 The study found that a right to surrogacy as a right to 
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assisted procreation would be adjudged unintelligible to the extent that it is not possible to 
promise the effective protection of the interest at stake, where the protection requires the 
collaboration of a third party who in this case, is the surrogate mother.272 There is no valid 
claim one may make against any other party along the line of the duties owed to them. 
This is not the case however, when one has been bound up in a contract by their own doing. 
There are consequences for breach of contract that one must comply with if they go back on 
their word. There are also safe-guards in place to protect those who are considered the weaker 
parties in contractual relationships. The doctrine of freedom of contract states that there is no 
conflict between contractual freedom and contractual justice, as contractual freedom can only 
be exercised in voluntary agreements with fair terms.273 Unfair contracts cannot be claimed 
valid by appealing to contractual freedom.274 In this way, surrogacy agreements, when entered 
into, are an exercise of the freedom of contract for as long as the terms remain fair.  
This research therefore found that the right to surrogacy is only enforceable as a contractual 
right. 
5.2.3 The Legal Parentage of the Child 
It was established in Chapter three that intention to parent should operate as the pre-birth 
determinant in ‘awarding’ parental status when a child is born.275 Intention here encompasses 
the motivation to have a child, initiation and involvement in the procreative process and a 
commitment to nurture and care.276 
This qualification is the most prudent as without the commissioning parents, the conception of 
the child would not have come about; they fully intend to be involved in the upbringing of the 
child; allowing otherwise gives the surrogate mother room to renege on her word; and intention 
based parenthood creates certainty that is in the best interests of the child as only those entirely 
committed to surrogacy would consider acting as surrogate mothers.277 
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5.3.1 The Commissioning Mother should be the Legal Mother 
The legal mother should be she who intended to bring about the creation of the child.278 
In cases where the commissioning mother, by having her egg fertilized and implanted in the 
surrogate mother, is also the genetic mother, there is a strong argument for adjudging her the 
legal mother of the child. The main argument is that although she did not physically bear the 
child, due to no fault of her own, she intended to bring about its conception and intends to be 
involved in its upbringing.279  
When however, due to unavoidable circumstances, the commissioning mother is not the genetic 
mother of the child, as the commissioning couple have likely utilised an egg donor, the 
argument has to be solely based on the intention to parent. She who shows that she is incapable 
of having children of her own and intends to be part of the parental unit responsible for the 
resulting child, should be adjudged the legal mother of the child. 
The commissioning parents intend to be parents and the surrogate mother intends to have a 
child for others.280 This should be the underlying argument. 
5.3.2 The Commissioning Father should be the Legal Father 
The determination of who the legal father is, is not as complicated as the determination of the 
legal mother. Ordinarily, the resulting child is related to its father and he is registered as the 
legal father of the child in the first instance.281 
However, this is based on the genetic relationship, which would suffice in cases of the normal 
conception of children. Surrogacy arrangements present unique and many times, 
unprecedented situations. Sometimes, only one parent has a genetic link to the child and it 
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would be undesirable to distinguish between parents by dictating that parenthood is based on 
genetics,282 as has been the case before.283 
5.3.1 Amendment of the Reproductive Health Care Bill 
The Reproductive Health Care Bill, before being passed as an Act, needs amendment to include 
provisions on the legal parentage of the resulting child, as this is an area of great contention in 
the practice of surrogacy. 
It is not enough to indicate that the surrogate mother, being the birth mother, is the legal mother 
of the child and then provide for the transfer of parenthood. This gives room for the surrogate 
mother to renege.284  
The Bill should indicate as the South African law does, that ‘any child born of a surrogate 
mother in accordance with the surrogate motherhood agreement is for all purposes the child of 
the commissioning parent or parents, from the moment of the birth of the child concerned’.285 
5.4 Conclusion 
The right to surrogacy has been analysed and it has been concluded, through an analysis of 
human rights and their determining standards, that such a right cannot be defended as a 
reproductive right. It would instead be more cogent as a contractual right.  
The status of parenthood was also examined and it was found that the standard model of 
parenthood, that is, one based on genetics, would not be the best fit for surrogacy arrangements 
as they present unique situations. This study has analysed three determinants of parenthood: 
genetic factors, gestational reasons and intention to parent. It has been concluded that while 
traditionally, intention to parent, genetics and gestation in the child bearing process have 
always intersected, in surrogacy arrangements, each of these functions may be found in a 
different party.286 The practice of surrogacy thus calls for the analysis of who has the intention 
to parent as the determining factor in order to enforce the intention of the parties to surrogacy 
agreements. 
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